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They have Cesar Chavez posters in their offices, and it’s, “Si, se puede;
si, se puede.”  But when it comes to their own workers, it’s, “No lo
puedo.”1
INTRODUCTION
Union drives in social service nonprofits are increasingly com-
monplace.  In recent years, nonprofit social service workers have
made efforts to affiliate with the Service Employees International
Union (SEIU),2 American Federation of State, County and Munici-
pal Employees (AFSCME),3 Communication Workers of America,4
Office and Professional Employees International Union (OPEIU),5
National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees,6 to name
a few.7  Yet despite their contemporary and enduring signifi-
* Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law.  The Author
thanks Diana Yoon for her excellent research assistance and Rebecca Weston and the
New York University Lawyering Faculty for their invaluable comments on earlier
drafts of this Article.
1 The Author overheard this comment in 1998 while on a picket line to support
the unionization of workers at La Raza Centro Legal, a community law office in San
Francisco.  “Si, se puede,” is Spanish for “yes, we can,” a pro-union chant immortal-
ized by Cesar Chavez and the United Farm Workers.  “No lo puedo” means “no, I
can’t.”
2 See, e.g., Suzanne Espinosa Solis, AIDS Group Workers Vote to Unionize, S.F. CHRON.,
Apr. 23, 1994, at A19; Ilana DeBare, In the Name of the Father: Catholic Values Invoked by
Both Sides in Hospitals’ Battle with Union, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 25, 1998, at D1.
3 See, e.g., Robin J. Moody, Nonprofits Get Organized, PORTLAND BUS. J., July 16,
2004, at 1, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/portland/stories/2004/07/19/
story1.html.
4 See, e.g., Angela Cortez, Detox Staffers Vote for Union, DENVER POST, Jan. 10, 1998,
at C-03.
5 See, e.g., Jack Hopkins, El Centro, Union Settle Dispute, SEATTLE POST-INT., July 16,
1998, at B2.
6 See, e.g., Lini S. Kadaba, Labor Leaders Organize Unions for Philadelphia Child Care
Workers, PHIL. INQ., Apr. 21, 1998.
7 See generally Fredrick Kunkle, Home Therapists Give Inova A Dose of Unions, WASH.
POST, Oct. 30, 2000, at B07 (Organization of Home Care Professionals); Center for
Disabled Workers Target of Union, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Sept. 5, 2002, at E4
(Union of Needletrades, Industrial, and Textile Employees); John Downey, Local Non-
profit’s Workers OK Union Representation, CHARLOTTE BUS. J., Apr. 11, 2005, at http://
charlotte.bizjournals.com/charlotte/stories/2005/04/11/story7.html (United Steel-
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cance—nonprofit workers today provide more social services than
the federal, state, and local government combined, and analysts
predict their ranks to continue to grow in the years ahead—the
trend has attracted little scholarly attention.  Thus far, scholars
have examined emerging issues from management’s perspective;8
linked union standards with the provision of quality client ser-
vices;9 and identified a mutuality of interests between nonprofit
management and the labor movement.10  In a groundbreaking
2000 study based on the interviews of forty nonprofit staff and
board members, professional union organizers, and foundation
personnel in San Francisco and New York, Jeanne Peters and Jan
Masaoka categorized five emerging themes facing nonprofit man-
agement: decision-making, management and human resource
management, wages and benefits, political context, and racial ten-
sion.11  Discussing “women’s work,” Peggie Smith called for the
unionization of child care workers to ensure quality affordable
child care, arguing that placing the concerns of child care workers
“at the center of child care policies is . . . critical . . . to solving the
child care crisis.”12  Kristin Jenkins Gerrick made a similar argu-
ment with respect to home health care workers.13  Finally, observ-
ing a mutuality of the interests between Community Action
Agencies (CAA) that run Head Start programs and the labor move-
ment, Eloise Passachoff urged CAA management and organized la-
bor to press cooperatively for legislative and administrative reform
and pursue other joint initiatives.14
This Article joins this nascent area of study and examines non-
profit union organizing from an institutional perspective.  Using
anecdotal information about unionization efforts at private, com-
workers of America); Bennett Baumer, Lifespire Under Fire: Staffers Consider Union, CITY
LIMITS, Aug. 15, 2005, at http://citylimits.org/content/articles/weeklyView.cfm?arti-
clenumber=1762 (Civil Services Employees Association).
8 Jeanne B. Peters & Jan Masaoka, A House Divided: How Nonprofits Experience Union
Drives, 10 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 3 (Spring 2000).
9 See generally Peggie R. Smith, Caring for Paid Caregivers: Linking Quality Child Care
with Improved Working Conditions, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 399 (2004); Kristin Jenkins Ger-
rick, An Inquiry into Unionizing Home Healthcare Workers: Benefits for Workers and Patients,
29 AM. J.L. & MED. 117 (2003).
10 See generally Eloise Passachoff, “Head Start Works Because We Do:” Head Start Pro-
grams, Community Action Agencies, and the Struggle Over Unionization, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 247 (2003).
11 Peters & Masaoka, supra note 8.
12 Smith, supra note 9, at 402.
13 Gerrick, supra note 9, at 133.
14 Passachoff, supra note 10, at 247–48.
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munity-based social service and advocacy organizations15—and in-
formed by the Author’s own experience working in the nonprofit
sector and with labor unions16—it asks a basic question:  Do unions
belong in social service nonprofits, or are such efforts somehow
misguided?  Social service nonprofits play a dual institutional role:
as progressive organizations representing society’s highest ideals
and as governance structures mediating the vagaries of social
spending.  Union drives bare a deep tension in this role.  Depend-
ing on how they are conceived, unions are either salvation or
anathema.  This Article examines their roles and explores strate-
gies to harmonize their conflicting tendencies.  Among those strat-
egies, this Article argues that the industry-wide unionization of
social service nonprofits is the best means by which to actualize the
nonprofit ethos and counteract these organizations’ tendency to
lower wages and working conditions, thereby facilitating cuts in so-
cial spending.  Part I discusses the factors that have led to increased
unionization among social service nonprofit workers.  Part II sum-
marizes recurring issues and discusses this specific role conflict.  Fi-
nally, Part III harmonizes this dual role, making the case for
industry-wide unionization and concludes by discussing union or-
ganizing as a uniquely transformative process.
15 Lester Salamon has noted the difficulty of defining the term “social service non-
profits.” LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA’S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 81 (1999)
[hereinafter SALAMON, NONPROFIT PRIMER] (“The term itself is ambiguous, and the
range of organizations typically grouped under it exceedingly diverse.”). This Article
uses the term “social-service nonprofits” to include advocacy organizations and specifi-
cally focuses on incorporated organizations providing “social and legal services, in-
cluding individual and family social services, job training, and vocational
rehabilitation services, residential care, day-care, and legal aid services; [and] civic,
including advocacy organizations, civil rights organizations, neighborhood-based or-
ganizations. . . .” Id. at 33. Salamon differentiates between nonprofit organizations
that are “member-serving” (e.g. labor unions and social and fraternal organizations),
which cater primarily to its members, versus those that are “public-serving” (e.g.
churches and social service providers), which cater primarily to the public. Id. at 22.
Of the 1.6 million nonprofit groups currently in existence, about 400,000 are “mem-
ber-serving” and 1.2 million “public-serving.” Id. “Public-serving” groups are com-
prised of four distinct organizations:  funding intermediaries, religious congregations,
service providers, and advocacy agencies. Id. at 24.  The latter two are the “heart of
the public-serving nonprofit sector.” Id. at 32.  Accounting for 40% of all nonprofits,
they employ 80% of all nonprofit employees. Id. at 32–33.  For a more detailed dis-
cussion of the term “social services,” see Steven Rathgeb Smith, Social Services, in THE
STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA 152 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002) [hereinafter STATE
OF NONPROFIT AMERICA].
16 I have worked with such nonprofits as the Northern California Coalition for
Immigrant Rights, Community Service Society, American Civil Liberties Union, and
Center for Constitutional Rights; and with such unions as the Service Employees In-
ternational Union (SEIU), Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union
(HERE), and International Longshore and Warehouse Workers Union (ILWU).
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I. THE NONPROFIT SOCIAL SERVICE INDUSTRY
Three interrelated trends underlie the wave of unionization in
social service nonprofits:  the dramatic growth of the nonprofit sec-
tor; the neo-conservative/neo-liberal era of fiscal austerity—in par-
ticular the privatization of social services historically delivered by
the state and resulting “marketization” of nonprofits—and the la-
bor movement’s turn from the manufacturing to the service sector.
Taken together, these trends explain why labor unions were moti-
vated to organize social service nonprofits and why nonprofit work-
ers increasingly turned to unions to address workplace concerns.
A. Growth: The Great Society and the Nonprofit Sector
“Why don’t you guys cut all that shit, freedom riding and sit-
ting in shit, and concentrate on voter registration,” Attorney Gen-
eral Robert Kennedy infamously admonished leaders of the
Congress for Racial Equality and Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee during the Civil Rights movement.  “If you do that, I’ll
get you tax-free status.”17  This vulgar moment captures a historic
compromise that defined an era:  In their quest for more radical
social transformation, the progressive social movements of the
1960s and early 1970s18 spurred the creation of the Great Society
programs, which, in turn, swelled the nonprofit sector.19  The
growth was a uniquely American experience attributable, accord-
ing to Lester Salamon, to “ingrained American attitudes of hostility
to central government.”20  With only minor interruptions during
the recessions of 1991 and 2001, the nonprofit sector has experi-
enced continuous growth,21 providing an ever-increasing percent-
17 HOWARD ZINN, SNCC: THE NEW ABOLITIONISTS 235 (1965).
18 For a succinct history of these social movements, see VAN GOSSE, THE MOVE-
MENTS OF THE NEW LEFT 1950–1975: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS (Bedford/St.
Martin’s, 2005).
19 Citing the work of Lester Salamon, Dennis Young has described the particular
features of governance in the United States:  “[T]he 1960s was the watershed era in
which the United States emphatically embraced the third party government model by
significantly expanding expenditures on social programs without commensurate en-
largement of government employment.  Rather than delivered through government
bureaucracy, new services were implemented largely through arrangements with pri-
vate, nonprofit suppliers.”  Dennis R. Young, Third Party Government, in THE NATURE
OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 365 (J. Steven Ott ed., 2001) [hereinafter NATURE OF NON-
PROFIT SECTOR].
20 SALAMON, NONPROFIT PRIMER, supra note 15, at 63.
21 Cassie J. Moore, Nonprofit Organizations Are Hiring Workers at a Faster Pace Than
Government, Business, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, June 10, 2004, at 37; John S. Irons &
Gary Bass, Recent Trends in Nonprofit Employment and Earnings: 1990–2004, OMB WATCH
TAX AND BUDGET REPORTS 3 (2004).
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age of the total social services available within the United States.
The creation of a vast nonprofit sector has attracted the inter-
est of a wide range of scholars, many of whom have measured its
spectacular growth over the past four decades.22  For example,
Steven Rathgeb Smith and Michael Lipsky found that, between
1965 and 1970, federal expenditures for social welfare services
nearly tripled and a large portion went to private nonprofits.23  Be-
tween 1965 and 1980, government spending on social welfare grew
by 637%—more than 15% per year in real dollars—and expanded
from 11.5% of gross national product to 18.5%.24  “During the first
part of this period, 1965–1975, the principal source of growth was
actual program expansion triggered by the creation of a host of
new federal programs.  Between 1975 and 1980, the principal
source of growth was inflation, which boosted pension and health
payments considerably.”25  Between 1977 and 1996, the nonprofit
sector growth outpaced the growth of the economy as a whole—
expanding by 96% after inflation compared with a 64% growth in
gross domestic product.26
Organizations grew exponentially.  In 1967, Burton Weisbrod
observed that 309,000 organizations were designated tax-exempt by
the Internal Revenue Service.27  In less than twenty years, that num-
ber would triple.28  Correspondingly, in that same period, non-
22 For an interesting historical account of the development of the nonprofit sec-
tor, see Peter Dobkin Hall, Inventing the Nonprofit Sector: 1950-1990, in NATURE OF NON-
PROFIT SECTOR, supra note 19, at 112.
23 STEVEN RATHGEB SMITH & MICHAEL LIPSKY, NONPROFITS FOR HIRE 55 (1993).
24 SALAMON, NONPROFIT PRIMER, supra note 15, at 61.
25 Id.
26 Id. at  68.
27 BURTON A. WEISBROD, NONPROFIT ECONOMY 62 (1988).
28 Id. This is probably an underestimation of the total number of nonprofits be-
cause many do not incorporate or have significant enough income to apply for tax-
exempt status.  Weisbrod also notes that through the late 1950s and early 1960s, the
Internal Revenue Service was receiving about 7000 applications for tax-exempt status.
Id. at 63.  That number doubled in 1965 (to 14,000) and quadrupled by 1984 (to
more than 64,000, but dropped substantially to 59,000 in 1985). Id. Cf. Dennis R.
Young, Complementary, Supplementary or Adversarial? A Theoretical and Historical Examina-
tion of Nonprofit-Government Relations in the United States, in NONPROFITS AND GOVERN-
MENT: COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT 31, 52 (Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steurele
eds., 1999) [hereinafter COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT] (noting that the federal gov-
ernment allocated “massive new funding for social services, health care, education,
and the arts” after World War II, “but largely resisted the creation or expansion of
new government bureaucracies to deliver those services.  In terms of theory, the trans-
actions and production costs associated with contracting with or subsidizing existing
nonprofits, as well as creating many new nonprofit organizations, were apparently
more reasonable than those associated with administering a greatly expanded govern-
mental delivery system”).
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profit employment increased from 9.3% to 11.7% of total
nonagricultural employment.29  Specifically, the sector’s annual
growth rate was highest between 1987 and 199230—the years imme-
diately preceding the recent wave of unionization.31  From 1997 to
2001, the social services field experienced the highest percentage
increase in employment:  a growth rate of more than 17%.32
As of 1998, the latest year for which comprehensive data are
available, there were an estimated 1.6 million nonprofit organiza-
tions in the United States, employing approximately 10.9 million
paid workers.33  Together, they provide some 20% of all services.34
Health and educational organizations comprise nearly 70% of this
vast sector.35  Taken together, they account for about $445 billion
in total nonprofit revenues.36  In contrast, social and legal services,
and civic, social and fraternal organizations account for approxi-
mately 15% ($94.6 billion) of revenues.37  Correspondingly, health
and education/research organizations employ nearly 65% of all
paid nonprofit workers (7.1 million), while social and legal ser-
vices, and civic, social, and fraternal organizations employ slightly
over 20% (2.4 million).38
A statistical finding particularly germane is that, among all
nonprofits, civic and social service organizations are experienc-
ing39—and are expected to continue to experience40—the fastest
29 WEISBROD, supra note 27, at 62.
30 Id.
31 See supra notes 2–7.
32 Moore, supra note 21.
33 INDEP. SECTOR AND URBAN INST., THE NEW NONPROFIT ALMANAC AND DESK REFER-
ENCE, at xxix (2001), excerpt available at http://www.independentsector.org/PDFs/
NAExecSum.pdf [hereinafter NONPROFIT ALMANAC]. Unlike the business sector, vol-
unteer labor accounts for a substantial part of nonprofit employment.  In 1998, the
sector was estimated to have benefited from the volunteer efforts of some 5.8 million
full-time-equivalent workers. Id. This number has broad ramifications for labor or-
ganizing but is outside the scope of this Article.
34 Id. at 34; SALAMON, NONPROFIT PRIMER, supra note 15, at 22; Moore, supra note
21. The size of the nonprofit sector is, of course, dwarfed by the business sector,
which comprises 93.8% of all organizations in the United States. NONPROFIT ALMA-
NAC, supra note 33, at xxviii.  Of the total 27.7 million organizations in the U.S. in
1998, 26 million were corporate. Id.
35 NONPROFIT ALMANAC, supra note 33, at 5.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 9.
39 SALAMON, NONPROFIT PRIMER, supra note 15, at 69.
40 ARSEN J. DARNAY, AMERICAN SALARIES AND WAGES SURVEY 1559 (6th ed. 2001).
According to this data, which reflect figures reported between October and Decem-
ber 1999, social workers are expected to increase 36.1% between 1998 and 2008,
while “welfare eligibility workers and interviewers” are expected to decrease 7.6%,
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growth.  Today, they constitute an estimated 56% of all nonprofits
in the country41 and, as of 1997, employed between 1.6 million to 2
million workers.42  These are the workers who provide child care,
individual and family counseling, information and referral services,
employment and training services, emergency relief, immigrant
and disaster assistance, rape crisis counseling, AIDS-related ser-
vices, domestic violence shelters, advocacy services, and a variety of
other social services.  They are the focus of this Article.43
B. Challenge: The Neoconservative/Neoliberal Agenda
Just as the progressive social movements of the 1960s and early
1970s ushered a massive expansion in federal social spending, so
the social conservatism of the 1980s and 1990s curtailed it.  Social
service organizations comprise the nonprofit subsector most reli-
ant on government financial support.  In 1997, for example, this
subsector drew 52% of its revenues from the state.44  Cuts in state
social spending wrought by the neoconservative/neoliberal agenda
wreaked havoc on social service organizations; many folded out-
right.  Those that survived faced stiffer competition and were sub-
sequently forced to adopt increasingly market-oriented practices.
The mantra of fiscal conservatism began to dominate federal
social spending policy in the 1980s.  During that period “the Rea-
gan administration attacked federal spending in precisely the areas
where federal support to nonprofit organizations was most exten-
sive.”45  As a result, “federal support to nonprofit organizations,
suggesting the privatization of these jobs. Id.  But see Irons & Bass, supra note 21 (con-
cluding that the nonprofit labor market has “weakened significantly”).  Specifically,
the percentage of workers classified as “social and human service assistants” is ex-
pected to grow 52.7% between 1998 and 2008—from 268,444 to 409,872 workers. Id.
41 SALAMON, NONPROFIT PRIMER, supra note 15, at 33 (educational organizations
account for 22%; health organizations 14%; and cultural/recreational organizations
8%). Id.
42 Smith, supra note 15, at 154–58.
43 Id. at 155; see also SALAMON, NONPROFIT PRIMER, supra note 15, at 33.
44 NONPROFIT ALMANAC, supra note 33, at xxxvi; see also WARREN JENSEN, NONPROFIT
LANDSCAPES: A STUDY OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS IN NORTHEASTERN CALIFORNIA 16
(2002) (70% of funding of northeastern California nonprofits comes from
government).
45 Lester M. Salamon, The Resilient Sector: The State of Nonprofit America, in STATE OF
NONPROFIT AMERICA, supra note 15, at 3, 12 [hereinafter Salamon, Resilient Sector].  In
another study, Salamon and others estimate that “the percentage of GDP devoted to
federal spending in areas of interest to nonprofits, outside of Medicare, Medicaid,
and income assistance, declined some 40 percent between FY 1980 and FY 1997, so
that by FY 1997 it was only 60 percent of what it had been in FY 1980.”  Alan J. Abram-
son et al., The Nonprofit Sector and the Federal Budget: Recent History and Future Directions,
in COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT, supra note 28, at 99, 105.  A common misconcep-
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outside of Medicare and Medicaid, declined approximately 25% in
real dollar terms in the early 1980s and returned to its 1980 level
only in the late 1990s.”46  Social service organizations providing day
care, counseling, employment and training, legal services, and
other services to children, families, and the elderly were “the big-
gest losers in dollar terms over the [fiscal year] 1982–97 period.”47
Cumulatively, these agencies lost about $2.2 billion a year.48  Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan argued that his budget cuts would provide op-
portunities for private nonprofits.  Promoting private initiative as a
panacea for the shortfall, he exhorted in a 1982 address to the New
York Partnership:
You believe private initiative, the private sector, are essential to
economic and social progress—and so do all of us in our Ad-
ministration . . . .  The key to rebuilding communities is individ-
ual initiative, leadership, personal responsibility . . . .  No one
denies that Government has an essential role to protect those in
need, to provide opportunity, to pave the way, but ultimately, it
is individuals—millions of everyday citizens—who brave new ho-
rizons, expand freedom and create better lives for us all.49
“To those who pointed out that such organizations relied ex-
tensively on government support to enable them to carry out their
existing functions,” wrote Salamon, “the administration expressed
the hope that private giving would fill any resulting gap.”50  It did
not.  In fact, partly because of Reagan’s regressive tax policy, which
made charitable giving more costly, private charitable giving fell as
a share of total nonprofit income—from 17% in 1977 to 10% in
1996.51  Thus, the nonprofits that survived the Reagan-era cuts or
came into existence during and after that period were forced to
work harder.
1. Era of Privatization
Yet even as those austerity measures destroyed parts of the so-
tion about the nonprofit sector is that it is funded primarily by foundation grants and
individual donations.  In truth, the majority of funding comes from government.
46 Salamon, Resilient Sector, supra note 45, at 12.
47 Abramson et al., supra note 45, at 112.
48 Id.  Nonprofits lost a total of $55.3 billion between fiscal years 1982 and 1997—
or $3.5 billion per year. Id.
49 Excerpts from Address by Reagan on Role of Private Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1982,
at A14; see also Barbara R. Bergmann, Charity Needs Coercion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1981,
at 3; Study Finds Groups that Help the Poor Hurt by Budget Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1982,
at D18; Barnaby J. Feder, Cutting Big Government, Round 2, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1989, at
4.
50 SALAMON, NONPROFIT PRIMER, supra note 15, at 67.
51 Id. at 70; see also Abramson et al., supra note 45, at 114–17.
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cial service subsector,52 the subsector as a whole continued to grow,
albeit at a slower rate.53  Unlike the previous era, however, when
growth went hand-in-hand with government expansion, growth be-
ginning in the 1980s came increasingly in lieu of it.  Eugene Steu-
rele and Virginia Hodgkinson observed that, in this period, growth
in nonprofit employment nearly mirrored the decline in govern-
ment employment.54
Many of our government officials like to proclaim their success
at reducing the size of government and point in particular to
the decline in the direct employment of individuals.  In truth,
what has occurred in large part is that the government has in-
creasingly paid others to perform the work it finances.55
In other words, non-union social service nonprofit workers simply
replaced their unionized counterparts in government.
The state has always depended on private entities to deliver
services.56  This form of privatization57—through so-called
purchase-of-service (POS) agreements—was in fact the corner-
stone of nonprofit sector growth in the 1960s and 1970s.58  In 1971,
for example, POS agreements represented 25% of state spending
on social services.  By 1976, this figure had increased to 49%.59  To-
day, it is nearly 60%.60
52 Since the Clinton-era Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat.
251 (1998), for example, 32% of home health care agencies have closed. Gerrick,
supra note 9, at 121.
53 This partly had to do with continued increases in Medicaid and Medicare ex-
penditures, which boosted health care nonprofits (and prompted many who lost
funding from other programs to simply shift federal draw-downs to these programs).
SALAMON, NONPROFIT PRIMER, supra note 15, at 116–17.
54 C. Eugene Steurele & Virginia A. Hodgkinson, Meeting Social Needs: Comparing
Resources of the Independent Sector and Government, in COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT,
supra note 28, at 71, 88.
55 Id.
56 Michael Dukakis, Personal Reflections on Purchase of Services: A View from a State
Capitol, in THE PRIVATIZATION OF HUMAN SERVICES: CASE STUDIES IN THE PURCHASE OF
SERVICES 19 (Margaret Gibelman & Harold W. Demone, Jr. eds., 1998).
57 Other forms of privatization include voucher programs and sale of state assets.
See generally DEMETRA SMITH NIGHTINGALE & NANCY M. PINDUS, PRIVATIZATION OF PUB-
LIC SOCIAL SERVICES (1997), available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=407023&
renderforprint=1.
58 Ralph M. Kramer, Voluntary Agencies and the Contract Culture: “Dream or
Nightmare?”, in NATURE OF NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 19, at 369.
59 SMITH & LIPSKY, supra note 23, at 55.
60 Elizabeth T. Boris, Introduction: Nonprofit Organizations in a Democracy: Varied Roles
and Responsibilities, in COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT, supra note 28, at 15; see also Hil-
lel Schmid, The Role of Nonprofit Human Service Organizations in Providing Social Services:
A Prefatory Essay, in ADMIN. IN SOC. WORK, 2004, at 1, 6 (health and social services
nonprofits provide 59.8% of services).
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Even in the earlier era of overall growth, POS policy had been
intended explicitly to counteract the gains of the union movement
in the government sector.  Government subcontracting “blos-
somed” in the 1970s primarily because of “the dramatic rise in the
pay of local government employees in the 1960s and 1970s.”61  It
was then that unions were able to
successfully challenge[ ] . . . laws exempting city employees from
unemployment compensation, social security, minimum wage
protection and other benefits enjoyed by the private sector
worker.  The resulting increases in pay and benefits made public
sector workers a more expensive proposition than ever before.
Local public employee unions experienced dramatic member-
ship increases. . . .  Whereas previously public employees had
given municipalities total control over public expenditures in re-
turn for job security, unions in the 1970s began to demand a
larger role in local policy-making for their members.  As a result,
many local public officials gradually abandoned their protective
attitudes toward employees, and began to consider cost-saving
alternatives such as contracting out.62
Thus, the expansion of the nonprofit social service sector in the
1970s was, by design, an expansion premised on flouting union
standards.63  What became of paramount concern to labor unions
and nonprofit workers in the subsequent era was the use of POS
agreements to privatize existing union jobs.64  Privatization resulted
in huge cost savings, which benefited not nonprofit workers, but
“the new owners or operators” and the government.65
The incentive to contract with nonprofits is obvious.  Nonprof-
its are “flexible” and cheaper.66  Government prefers them because
61 MARVIN J. LEVINE, PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT: THE DELIVERY OF PUBLIC
GOODS AND SERVICES BY PRIVATE MEANS 5 (1990).
62 Id. at 6.
63 Of particular relevance here, too, is the fact that there was deep distrust be-
tween the New Left activists and government at that time, which contributed to the
privatization of what otherwise would have been government jobs. Id. at 6.
64 Id. at 10–19.
65 Michael Glanzer, Union Strategies in Privatizations: Shakespeare-Inspired Alternatives,
64 ALB. L. REV. 437, 440 (2001).  The growth of purchase-of-service agreements since
the 1980s has blurred the boundaries between public and private sectors as “reflected
in numerous metaphors, such as third-party government, indirect public administra-
tion, the contract state, nonprofit federalism, the new or mixed political economy of
welfare, and so forth.” Kramer, supra note 58, at 31; cf. Nancy Ehrenreich, The Progres-
sive Potential in Privatization, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1235, 1237 (1996) (arguing that
privatization need not serve conservative ends).
66 See Thomas A. Reiner, Privatizing State and Local Government Services: The Role of
Not-for-Profit Organizations, in RESTRUCTURING STATE AND LOCAL SERVICES: IDEAS, PRO-
POSALS, AND EXPERIMENTS 121 (Arnold H. Raphaelson ed., 1998).
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they can limit transaction costs, have experience in service delivery,
and are thought to be more responsive to diverse client groups.67
In 1992, for example, a typical group-home counselor employed by
the State of New York earned an annual salary of $25,500, while a
nonprofit counselor made $16,900.68  Ultimately, the threat this
disparity posed to unionized civil sector jobs forced unions—partic-
ularly government sector unions—to organize nonprofits.
2. “Marketization” of the Nonprofit Sector
The era of privatization—along with the new culture of fiscal
austerity—increased market competition among nonprofits and
between nonprofits and for-profits.  These trends, in turn, led to
the increased “marketization” of the nonprofit sector.  Conse-
quently, today nonprofits are “drawing far closer to the market
economy than perhaps at any time in their history.”69
Neil Gilbert has described this process as one of “transforma-
tion.”70  To compete for dwindling federal and state dollars, social
service nonprofits increasingly adopted the market culture, while
management—and nonprofit staff in general—professionalized.71
Nonprofit management extolled corporate methods.72  Nonprofits
partnered with big business, spun off for-profits, and increasingly
relied on fees for services.  To the extent that they infused the non-
profit sector with more efficient, professional methods, these
changes were a welcome development, but the changes also desta-
bilized the nonprofit sector.  For example, Rathgeb Smith ob-
served that increased reliance on fees for services “means that
nonprofits are in an inherently more unpredictable and unstable
revenue situation . . . .  [A]n indirect effect [of this instability] is to
add further pressure on nonprofits to be entrepreneurial and
more businesslike in order to compete more effectively in the new,
67 James M. Ferris, The Double-Edged Sword of Social Service Contracting: Public Account-
ability Versus Nonprofit Autonomy, in NATURE OF NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 19, at
395–96.
68 Michael Winerip, On Sunday, What Do Nonprofits Do? Take a Look, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 13, 1992, at 49.
69 Dennis R. Young & Lester M. Salamon, Commercialization, Social Ventures, and For-
Profit Competition, in SALAMON, STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA, supra note 15, at 429.
70 See Smith, supra note 15, at 150 n.1 (citing Neil Gilbert, The Transformation of
Social Services, 51 SOC. SERV. REV. 624, 641 (Dec. 1977)).
71 SALAMON, NONPROFIT PRIMER, supra note 15, at 164–65.
72 See, e.g., CompassPoint Nonprofit Services, http://www.compasspoint.org (last
visited Feb. 21, 2007); Nonprofit Risk Management Center, http://nonprofitrisk.org/
about/about.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2007); Alliance for Nonprofit Management,
http://www.allianceonline.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
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more unstable environment.”73  In an exaggeration that nonethe-
less spoke to this trend, another commentator observed that non-
profits were now “big business.”74
The new environment, observed Salamon, led to a “broader
and deeper penetration of the market culture into the fabric of
nonprofit operations:”
Nonprofit organizations are increasingly “marketing” their
“products,” viewing their clients as “customers,” segmenting
their markets, differentiating their output, identifying their
“market niche,” formulating “business plans,” and generally in-
corporating the language, and the style, of business manage-
ment into the operation of their agencies.  Management expert
Kevin Kearns argues that nonprofit executives are now “among
the most entrepreneurial managers to be found anywhere, in-
cluding the private for-profit sector.”75
Indeed, “nonprofit America appears to be well along in a fun-
damental process of ‘reengineering’ that calls to mind the similar
process that large segments of America’s business sector have un-
dergone since the late 1980s,” noted Salamon.76  Corporate
America borrowed from nonprofits as well, increasingly “incorpo-
rating management approaches that have long been associated
with nonprofit work, such as the emphasis on organizational mis-
sion, the ethos of service to clients, and the need to imbue staff
with a sense of purpose beyond the maximization of profit.”77
The Clinton-era 1996 welfare reform legislation78 dramatized
the challenges nonprofits faced during this period by allowing for-
profit companies to compete for social service contracts.  To fight
for a $40 million welfare-to-work contract, for example, the YWCA
of Greater Milwaukee had to create a for-profit limited liability cor-
poration with two for-profit partners.79  Without emulating corpo-
rate culture, nonprofits were simply no match for corporate giants
73 Smith, supra note 15, at 173.
74 Passachoff, supra note 10, at 258.
75 Salamon, Resilient Sector, supra note 45, at 39.
76 Id. at 6.
77 Id.; see also Burton A. Weisbrod, The Complexities of Income Generation for Nonprofits,
in FUTURE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 103 (Virginia A. Hodgkinson, Richard W.
Lyman and Assoc., eds., 1989).
78 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.
and 42 U.S.C.); see also Christine N. Cimini, Welfare Entitlements in the Era of Devolution,
9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 89, 92–104 (2002) (summarizing history of welfare
system and changes wrought by 1996 reform).
79 BILL BERKOWITZ, PROSPECTING AMONG THE POOR: WELFARE PRIVATIZATION 16
(May 2001), available at http://www.arc.org/pdf/296bpdf.pdf.
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like Lockheed Martin, Maximus, and Electronic Data Systems,
which also vied for such contracts.80
The process of marketization also caused the broad vision and
long-term goals of nonprofits to conflict with the short-term, mar-
ket-inspired goals of for-profit companies.  This conflict made it
particularly hard for nonprofits to compete for contracts.   As
Rathgeb Smith explained:
Performance standards for . . . agencies are set in a top-down
fashion, primarily at the federal level.  This can cause conflicts
with agency missions and orientations.  For example, in job
training programs, the federal emphasis is on job placement,
whereas many community-based organizations are much more
likely to emphasize “living wage” jobs and longer-term job train-
ing to achieve this goal.  Government also takes a much more
restricted view of eligible clients than community organizations
do.81
This comment by William Ryan spoke to the institutional conflict
that followed:
By playing in the new marketplace . . . [nonprofits] will [be]
force[d] . . . to reconfigure their operations and organizations
in ways that could compromise their missions . . . .  It is precisely
this . . . that could endanger the nonprofits as they are forced to
adopt—and perhaps abandon—the very qualities that enabled
them to advance social causes in the first place.82
C. Organized Labor’s Turn to the Service Sector and Nonprofits
As the nonprofit sector underwent this transformation, the la-
bor movement went through a crisis of its own.  During this period,
organized labor turned its focus away from the manufacturing sec-
tor and onto the service sector for two interrelated reasons.  First,
because unions have been historically concentrated in the indus-
trial sector, when the U.S. economy de-industrialized in the 1970s,
union density declined.83  Unions therefore had to find new sec-
80 Id.
81 Smith, supra note 15, at 174.
82 William P. Ryan, The New Landscape for Nonprofits, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb.
1999, at 127, 134.
83 “Military Keynesianism . . . strained the financial system to the point of crisis and
contributed to the virtual destruction of the competitive position of American manu-
factures.” MIKE DAVIS, PRISONERS OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 181 (1986).  The recession
that lasted from November 1973 to March 1975 was “by far the longest and deepest
economic downturn in the United States . . . since the Great Depression.” THOMAS
FERGUSON & JOEL ROGERS, RIGHT TURN: THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATS AND THE
FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS 78 (1987).  It was the time in which “the great develop-
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tors of the economy to organize.  Second, in response to the politi-
cal agenda that accompanied de-industrialization—the “right turn”
that U.S. society undertook beginning in the mid-1970s—unions
increasingly took on a defensive position and retreated from con-
fronting big business.84  Threatened by a world economic crisis, su-
perior foreign competition—particularly from Japan and
Germany—and union militancy inspired by social movements of
the 1960s and 1970s,85 big business and its political allies counterat-
tacked.  As a Business Week editorial put it at the time:
Some people will have to do with less—cities and states, the
home mortgage market, small businesses and the consumer will
all get less than they want.  It will be a hard pill for many Ameri-
cans to swallow—the idea of doing with less so that big business
can have more.  Nothing that this nation or any other nation has
done in modern history compares in difficulty with the selling
job that must be done to make people accept the new reality.86
That “selling job” succeeded.  Wages and working conditions
have fallen steadily since then, a trend partly attributable to the
long-term decline in union membership.  From a peak rate of 27%
in 197987 union density has fallen to 13.8% today.88  To stem the
decline, unions turned to—and squabbled over—the rapidly ex-
panding service sector89 and one of its fastest growing segments:
nonprofits.90
The privatization of existing civil service positions served as
ments that eventually drove American politics to the right became dramatically evi-
dent.” Id.
84 See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 83; FERGUSON & ROGERS, supra note 83; HOWARD ZINN,
A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES  529 (1980).
85 See JEREMY BRECHER, STRIKE! 249–71 (1997) (discussing wildcat strikes of early
1970s).
86 John Carson-Parker, The Options Ahead for the Debt Economy, BUS. WEEK, Oct. 12,
1974, at 120, quoted in ROBERT FISHER, LET THE PEOPLE DECIDE: NEIGHBORHOOD OR-
GANIZING IN AMERICA 123 (1994).
87 U.S. Historical Tables: Union Membership, Coverage, Density and Employment,
1973–2006, http://www.trinity.edu/bhirsch/unionstats (follow “U.S. Historical Ta-
bles: Union Membership, Coverage, Density and Employment, 1973–2006 All Wage
and Salary Workers” hyperlink) [hereinafter U.S. Historical Tables]. See generally ART
PREIS, LABOR’S GIANT STEP (1964) (discussing the rise of the U.S. labor movement).
88 U.S. Historical Tables, supra note 87.
89 The service economy grew rapidly between 1970 and 1985. Denis Johnston &
Gabriel Rudney, Characteristics of Workers in Nonprofit Organizations, 110 MONTHLY LAB.
REV. 28, 28 (July 1987).
90 See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, A.F.L.-C.I.O. Puts Recruiting at Top of Its Agenda, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 1997, at 12; Jeff Sturgeon, Labor Hopes for Rebound: Union Leaders Plan
Campaign to Halt Declining Membership, ROANOKE TIMES (Va.), Mar. 3, 1996, at G1;
Frank Swoboda, A Matter of Organization: Labor Confronts Need to Boost Numbers, WASH.
POST, Sept. 8, 1998, at D9.
2006] WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON? 387
the catalyst for government sector unions such as the SEIU and
AFSCME to organize social service nonprofits.  At its convention in
1990, AFSCME—one of the unions hardest-hit by the privatization
agenda—resolved to organize nonprofit workers.91  In the Bay
Area, SEIU Local 790 reportedly received one million dollars to
organize nonprofits.92  These unions pursued a two-prong strategy:
stop privatization93 and “follow the work;” that is, organize the
agencies to which the work was contracted.94  The AFL-CIO de-
voted substantial resources to nonprofit campaigns.  By the mid-
1990s, nonprofit unionization gained prominent media attention,
and high-profile campaigns emerged in San Francisco, Boston, and
New York, among other cities.95  Observed Flo Green, Executive
Director of Los Angeles-based California Association of Nonprofits:
“It’s very clear to those of us in the nonprofit world that we have
been targeted.”96
D. Characteristics of Nonprofit Workers
No union strategy, no matter how well-planned, can succeed
without the initiative of nonprofit workers themselves.  The era of
fiscal austerity meant the altruism nonprofit workers brought to
their work came increasingly into conflict with market forces.  At
the same time, the direct conversion of civil service positions into
private nonprofit jobs also made it easier for nonprofit workers to
gain a different—perhaps more structural—perspective of their
working conditions.  By contracting out services that had been per-
91 AFSCME, Organizing the Unorganized, Res. 125 (1990), available at http://
www.afscme.org/resolutions/1990/r29-125.htm.  For an overview of AFSCME’s or-
ganizing campaign targeting privately operated social service work, see AFSCME—
Opening New Doors, http://www.afscme.org/publications/1201.cfm.
92 George Cothran & John Mecklin, Union Disorganizing, S.F. WEEKLY, Jan. 7, 1998,
at 6, available at http://www.sfweekly.com/Issues/1998-01-07/news/columns2.html.
SEIU Local 790 has grown from a 10,000-member union consisting mostly of public
employees in 1984 to a membership of more than 30,000 workers in the government,
private, and nonprofit sectors in 2003.  SEIU Local 790, http://www.seiu790.org/our
local (last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
93 In San Francisco, for example, SEIU 790 sought legislation that would stop the
city from contracting out services “that could potentially be performed” by city work-
ers; declare that it is “not the intent of the city” to use contracting out to pay lower
wages or benefits; and require employers with city contracts to maintain neutrality
during union drives.  Editorial, Stop This Contract Before It Soaks City, S.F. CHRON., June
23, 1997, at A20, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/1997/
06/23/ED37256.DTL.
94 Interview with Dale Butler, Field Representative, SEIU Local 790 in S.F., Cal.
(Dec. 2 & 5, 2005).
95 See supra notes 2–7.
96 John Yewell, Labor Pains, METRO SANTA CRUZ, June 25, 1998.
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formed by government workers, nonprofit workers were able to di-
rectly compare the terms of their employment with those of their
downsized counterparts.97  The characteristics defining the sizeable
nonprofit social service workforce that has emerged over the last
thirty years—and the conditions under which nonprofit workers in-
creasingly found themselves—became the staple issues of non-
profit unionization drives.
1. Altruism As a Motivating Factor
Nonprofit workers want to “do good.”98  A 2001–2002 survey
found that nonprofit workers were less motivated by “job security,
the salary, benefits or the paycheck” than they were by the “chance
to help the public, to make a difference, to do something worth-
while, and [to have] pride in the organization . . . .”99  Conse-
quently, they are more ideologically committed to their work, are
more political, and expect a more “collegial” and democratic or
participatory work environment.100  Because of these characteris-
tics, one writer observed, “employees of nonprofit groups, often
steeped in the discourses of rights and justice, are seen as more
likely to be pro-union.”101  Perhaps unsurprisingly, nonprofit work-
ers expect more autonomy in the workplace, which means that
they are more free to define their duties and therefore more prone
to experience greater job ambiguity (and less supervision)—a fact
that correlates with more stress on the job and more job
dissatisfaction.102
2. Substandard Wages, Benefits, and Working Conditions
“Unfortunately,” Paul Light observed, “nonprofit employees
love their work so much that they set themselves up for exploita-
97 Equity theory holds that “employee motivation not only depends on the pay and
performance relationship that the employee experiences, but it also depends on the
pay and performance of other employees with whom the person compares himself or
herself.  Social comparisons are very important.”  Joan E. Pynes & Meredith A. New-
man, Nonprofit Sector Unionization and Gender Equity, 21 REV. PUB. PERS. ADMIN. 5, 11
(Spring 2001).
98 Philip H. Mirvis & Edward J. Hackett, Work and Work Force Characteristics in the
Nonprofit Sector, 106 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 8 (April 1983).
99 Paul C. Light, The Content of Their Character: The State of the Nonprofit Workforce, 9
NONPROFIT Q. 6, 9 (Fall 2002).
100 Id. at 7–9.
101 Jennifer C. Berkshire, Nonprofit Groups Turn to Unions to Organize Workers and
Collaborate on Common Causes, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Nov. 21, 2002, http://
www.philanthropy.com/jobs/2002/11/28/20021128-945997.htm.
102 Mirvis & Hackett, supra note 98, at 8.
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tion.”103  The commitment to clients is, in fact, such a powerful
motivator that it sometimes discourages nonprofit workers from
leaving substandard employment.104  Thus, even as nonprofit work-
ers tend to be pro-union generally, they may not be pro-union for
themselves.
Believing that they should not take funds dedicated to client
programs, particularly when budgets are tight, many nonprofit
workers minimize their own work-related concerns.  In return for
the “intrinsic rewards” of nonprofit work,105 nonprofit workers
forego the better pay, benefits, and working conditions offered by
the for-profit and government sectors.106  Across the board, non-
profit pay for comparable work is 11% to 20% lower than pay in
the corporate and government sectors.107  One study found that
nonprofit workers earn only 67.5% of what comparable for-profit
workers make and 67.1% of what comparable government workers
make,108 figures that are apparently worsening.109  Between 1998
and 2003, for example, the salaries of all nonprofit workers rose
8%, 5% less than the increase for all other workers.110  Health, pen-
sion, and other benefits are also generally lower in the nonprofit
sector.111  Finally, nonprofit workers are less likely to be employed
full-time112 and are less likely to be promoted.113
103 Paul C. Light, The Nonprofit Example: Find a Way to Make Government More Like a
Nonprofit, and It Can Only Improve, GOV’T EXECUTIVE, Nov. 2002, at 76, available at
http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/light/november2002.htm.
104 Peters & Masaoka, supra note 8, at 312.
105 Light, supra note 99, at 9.
106 There is the school of thought, however, that nonprofit workers are generally
substandard; that is, they would otherwise not be as employable in the business or
government sector. See generally Anne E. Preston, The Nonprofit Worker in a For-Profit
World, 7 J. LAB. ECON. 438 (1989) (wage differential between workers in nonprofit
sector versus those in business and government possibly reflects low quality in for-
mer); CAROL L. BARBEITO & JACK P. BOWMAN, NONPROFIT COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
PRACTICES (1998).
107 Christopher J. Ruhm & Carey Borkoski, Compensation in the Nonprofit Sector, 4 J.
HUM. RESOURCES 992 (2003). The wage gap can be explained by the concentration of
nonprofit work in the low-wage economy. Id. at 1017.  Nonprofit jobs are concen-
trated in seven “fairly narrowly defined” industries, including hospitals, social services,
education, and religious organizations. Id. at 1006–09; see also Preston, supra note
106, at 460; BARBEITO & BOWMAN, supra note 106, at 37–62.
108 Mirvis & Hackett, supra note 98, at 7.
109 Irons & Bass, supra note 21, at 4.
110 Harvy Lipman, A Growing Disparity, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Nov. 10, 2005, at
37.
111 Irons & Bass, supra note 21, at 7; BARBEITO & BOWMAN, NONPROFIT COMPENSA-
TION, supra note 106 at 62–74.
112 Johnston & Rudney, supra note 89, at 31.
113 See generally JED DEVARO & DANA SAMUELSON, WHY ARE PROMOTIONS LESS LIKELY
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3. High Productivity, Worker Burnout, and Turnover Rates
At the same time, nonprofit workers work long hours—on av-
erage 43.6 hours per week compared to 40.4 hours for government
workers114—in jobs that typically involve substantial emotional
challenges.115  It is no wonder that nonprofit workers often com-
plain of burnout.  In a 2001–2002 study, nonprofit employees “re-
ported high levels of stress and potential burnout.  Seven out of ten
strongly or somewhat agreed that they always have too much work
to do and that it is easy to burn out in their jobs.”116  These are jobs
serving a high demand with woefully inadequate resources.117
It is likely that this situation will only worsen because of in-
creased demand.  As John Irons and Gary Bass have found:
Recent studies and anecdotal evidence indicate that nonprofits
are being forced to provide more and more services to more
and more people.  With increases in outlays for non-labor items
(such as food, medical supplies, etc.) nonprofits might be
forced to reduce funding allocated to staff.118
Long-term demographic changes in the U.S. population are
also likely to exacerbate this situation.  As Salamon has observed,
“recent social and demographic trends such as increased female
participation in the labor force, the graying of the population, and
the rise in the divorce rate have expanded the demand for services
such as day care, nursing-home care, and counseling that nonprof-
its have traditionally provided.”119  Given these job conditions, it is
hardly surprising that there is a high level of turnover in nonprofit
social service jobs.  One study found that one out of three workers
leaves his or her job within two years.120
IN NONPROFIT FIRMS? (2003), available at http://client.norc.org/jole/SOLEweb/
DeVaro&Samuelson.pdf.
114 Mirvis & Hackett, supra note 98, at 7–8.
115 Gerrick, supra note 9, at 120.
116 Light, supra note 99, at 9.
117 Id.
118 Irons & Bass, supra note 21, at 6 (citing CAL. ASS’N OF NONPROFITS, HOLES IN THE
SAFETY-NET: STUDY OF FUNDING CUTBACKS AND SAFETY-NET NONPROFITS IN CALIFORNIA
(2004); WOODS BOWMAN, FISCAL CRISIS IN THE STATES: ITS IMPACT ON NONPROFIT OR-
GANIZATIONS AND THE PEOPLE THEY SERVE (2003); THOMAS GAIS ET AL., A DIVIDED COM-
MUNITY: THE EFFECTS OF STATE FISCAL CRISES ON NONPROFITS PROVIDING HEALTH AND
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE (2003)); see also Harvy Lipman & Elizabeth Schwinn, Faith in His
Budget, CHRON. OF PHILANTHOPY, Feb. 17, 2005, at 22 (noting that President Bush’s
2006 budget would “tighten eligibility rules so that 200,000 to 300,000 fewer people
would be eligible for food stamps by 2010 . . . and parents of some 300,000 children
would lose federal subsidies for child care”).
119 Moore, supra note 21, at 37.
120 Paul Schmitz & Kala Stroup, Building Tomorrow’s Nonprofit Work Force, CHRON. OF
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4. Demographics of Staff and Management
Nonprofit workers display the incongruous demographic trait
of being both more educated and less educated than other work-
ers.121  A 1980 survey revealed that 25% of nonprofit workers had
completed four or more years of college, while only 18% of the
entire labor force had achieved that level of education.122  Con-
versely, one third of nonprofit workers had not completed high
school, compared with only one quarter of non-high school gradu-
ates in the workforce as a whole.123
In the nonprofit sector, there is a higher ratio of professionals
to non-professionals than in the for-profit and government sec-
tors.124  Women125 and African Americans126 are also dispropor-
tionately represented.  For example, the “typical home health care
worker,” observed Gerrick, is a “middle-aged, minority female who
is a single head of household with a high school diploma.”127
Nonprofit management, on the other hand, resembles man-
agement in the for-profit sector:  It tends to be white, male and
well-paid.  For example, a study by the Chronicle of Philanthropy of
nonprofit compensation in more than 3770 organizations found
that, between 1998 and 2003, nonprofit CEOs’ pay grew at twice
the rate of the average nonprofit worker, rising 16% after adjusting
for inflation.128  In the same period the average nonprofit worker
salary grew only by 8%.129  In 2003, nonprofit leaders were paid five
times their average employee.130  If current trends continue, by
2018 nonprofit CEOs will be making six times what other employ-
ees are paid.131  While this gap may be insignificant compared to
PHILANTROPY, July 21, 2005, at 2; see also JEANNE PETERS ET AL., COMPASSPOINT NON-
PROFIT SERVS., HELP WANTED: TURNOVER AND VACANCY IN NONPROFITS 8 (2002), availa-
ble at http://www.compasspoint.org/assets/10_helpwanted.pdf (finding 8% vacancy
rate in total nonprofit workforce).




125 Mirvis & Hackett, supra note 98, at 4; Johnston & Rudney, supra note 89, at 32;
see BARBEITO & BOWMAN, supra note 106, at 10 (in 1994, women comprised 68.2% of
paid nonprofit workforce).
126 NONPROFIT ALMANAC, supra note 33, at 136.
127 Gerrick, supra note 9, at 119.
128 Lipman, supra note 110, at 37.
129 Id. at 26; see also Preston, supra note 106, at 460 (finding a far greater salary
differential between nonprofit and for-profit managers and professionals (–.20) than
the difference at the level of clerical and sales workers (–.05)).
130 Id.
131 Id. at 28.
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the wage gap in the corporate world, it does, as one writer put it,
“erode[ ] a sense that we’re all in this together.”132  Unsurprisingly,
this wage disparity has been one of the main factors animating pro-
union sentiment.
II. UNIONIZATION ISSUES AND THE SOCIAL SERVICE NONPROFITS’
INSTITUTIONAL ROLE
The specific workforce characteristics mentioned above are
the staple issues of union drives in social service nonprofits, though
these issues are generally no different from those that arise else-
where.  The difference is in the way the antagonists fight over
them—a difference, in turn, founded on the specific institutional
role of social service nonprofits.  Their dual role as both progres-
sive and regressive organizations leads proponents and opponents
of unionization to invoke one or the other side of this contradic-
tion—to the exclusion of the other—to support their positions.  In
the process, social service nonprofits also articulate competing ide-
ological visions on how to solve the problems they confront.
A. Recurring Issues
There are, to be sure, labor issues specific to nonprofit unioni-
zation.  Nonprofits that are religious or considered “political subdi-
visions” of the state are, for instance, exempt from the jurisdiction
of the National Labor Relations Board.133  Similarly, agencies that
132 Id. at 26.  The wage gap is of course nowhere near the corporate analogue:  In
2004, the average CEO in the corporate sector was paid 431 times that of the ordinary
worker. SARAH ANDERSON ET AL., EXECUTIVE EXCESS 2005: DEFENSE CONTRACTORS GET
MORE BUCKS FOR THE BANG 13 (Aug. 30, 2005), available at http://www.faireconomy.
org/press/2005/EE2005.pdf.
133 See, e.g., St. Edmund’s Roman Catholic Church, 337 N.L.R.B. 1260 (2002) (relig-
ious organization); Ukiah Adventist Hosp., 332 N.L.R.B. 602 (2000) (same); Hinds
County Human Res. Agency, 331 N.L.R.B. 1404 (2000) (political subdivision); Enrich-
ment Servs. Program, Inc., 325 N.L.R.B. 818 (1998) (same).  President George Bush’s
Faith-Based Initiative may lead to additional exemptions for religious organizations.
See Exec. Order No. 13,198, 3 C.F.R. 750 (2002), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (creating
seven agency centers for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives); Exec. Order No.
13,199, 3 C.F.R. § 752 (2002), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (declaring policy in favor of
including faith organizations in social service efforts and creating the White House
Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives to develop, lead, and coordinate ef-
forts to implement that policy); Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Establishment
of White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (Jan. 29, 2001),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/01/20010129-2.html.
This initiative can be seen as an effort to circumvent unionization in social service
nonprofits.  Although outside the scope of this Article, there are also labor issues
specific to both nonprofits that are already unionized and nonprofits in general.  For
example, nonprofit volunteers are typically exempt from the Fair Labor Standards
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contract with government—including nonprofits—may be obli-
gated to recognize existing bargaining units under certain
circumstances.134
Nonprofit workers and management battle over wages, bene-
fits, and racism, sexism, and homophobia in the workplace.135
They battle over agency mission, governance, and clientele; and
they battle over related political issues, such as privatization.136  Pe-
ters and Masaoka found similar themes,137 as did Passachoff.138  To
make one crude comparison, in the recent transit strike in New
York City, workers and management fought over wages and bene-
fits; spoke of the agency’s public service mission and on behalf of
their ridership; and contextualized their dispute within larger de-
velopments taking place politically and economically, most notably
around the question of pension benefits.139
B. The Battle over Institutional Role
What differentiates nonprofit unionization is the dynamic that
animates the clash of interests.  Social service nonprofits perform a
unique, contradictory role.140  Carol Estes, Elizabeth Binney, and
Linda Bergthold captured this contradiction in their observation
that nonprofits enjoy a “special legitimacy” because of their “histor-
ical and contemporary role and character [as representing] plural-
istic, participatory, and noneconomic motivations of charity and
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–219 (1988). See Bazil Facchina et al., Privileges and Exemptions
Enjoyed by Nonprofit Organizations, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 85, 114–16 (1993).
134 See generally Erin M. Gee, The Application of the Doctrine of Successorship to the Priva-
tization of Government Services, 32 CAL. W. L. REV. 167 (1995); B. Glenn George, Succes-
sorship and the Duty to Bargain, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 277 (1988).
135 See supra notes 2–7; Peters & Masaoka, supra note 8; Passachoff, supra note 10; see
also Pynes & Newman, supra note 97, at 5.
136 See supra notes 2–7; Peters & Masaoka, supra note 8; Passachoff, supra note 10.
137 Peters & Masaoka, supra note 8, at 305.  Peters and Masaoka review the scant
literature on this subject and observe that the range of issues motivating unionization
in nonprofits compares with those issues present elsewhere. Id. at 306–08.
138 Passachoff, supra note 10 (discussing wages, benefits, pensions, race, gender,
clientele, among others, as issues in Head Start union drives).
139 See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Transit Union Calls for Strike in Divided Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2005, at A1.
140 See generally Henry Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization, in THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR 27 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987) (discussing the different eco-
nomic and political roles of nonprofits); see also James Douglas, Political Theories of
Nonprofit Organization, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra, at 43; Kirsten G. Gronbjerg,
Markets, Politics, and Charity: Nonprofits in the Political Economy, in NATURE OF NONPROFIT
SECTOR, supra note 19, at 218 (“Nonprofits play a critical role in the U.S. political
economy.  As voluntary associations, they suit the American preference for private
auspices.  As institutions established for charitable or common purposes, they allevi-
ate the need for such action under public auspices.”).
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the spirit of giving, privatism, individualism, and the democratic
impulse.”141  These roles and characteristics are an eclectic agglom-
eration, but they can be boiled down to a dual conception.  On the
one hand, they advance progressive principles by their very exis-
tence:  Nonprofits undeniably occupy a revered position in the eco-
nomic, political, social, and ideological landscape.  Through
privatization, however, they also collectively have become a struc-
tural vehicle by which government circumvents union standards
and makes deep social spending cuts.  In this sense, they have
played a regressive institutional function.  In nonprofit unioniza-
tion, one or the other side of this equation becomes a primary
force.
1. The Pro-Union Position: Social Service Nonprofits As
Representative, Progressive Institutions
Everyone loves nonprofits—or at least what they represent.  It
seems that no amount of praise is sufficient for this unique institu-
tion.142  Although there is no fixed definition of the word “charita-
ble”—for the purposes of this Article the key qualification is tax-
exemption and hence nonprofit status143—the term “nonprofit”
connotes a certain humanity, ethicality, or morality, which are tax-
exemption rationales the Supreme Court has recognized in such
decisions as Walz v. Tax Commissioner144 and Bob Jones University v.
United States.145 The “government relieves from the tax burden re-
ligious, educational, and charitable activities,” one commentator
explained, “because it wishes to encourage them as representing the
highest and noblest achievements of mankind.”146  Consequently, as Pas-
141 Carol L. Estes et al., How the Legitimacy of the Sector Has Eroded, in FUTURE OF THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 77, at 22–23.
142 See, e.g., JEFFREY M. BERRY & DAVID F. ARONS, A VOICE FOR NONPROFITS 1–3
(2003) (nonprofits “represent what is best about our country . . . .  [N]onprofits have
a higher calling, a more noble purpose [and] embody the caring, charitable side of
us”); Schmid, supra note 60, at 10 (nonprofits “maintain an altruistic ideology of char-
ity and concern for others [and] fulfill a social mission aimed at promoting justice,
equality and well-being for individuals, groups and communities”).  Of course, there
have been high-profile cases of mismanagement in social service nonprofits.  But the
enmity resulting from them is trained on particular people, rather than on the institu-
tion as a whole. See James J. Fishman, The Nonprofit Sector: Myths and Realities, 9 N.Y.C.
L. REV. 303, pt. IV.
143 Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable
Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419, 429 (1998) (“charita-
ble” is to be applied in “its generally accepted legal sense”).
144 397 U.S. 664, 672–73 (1970).
145 461 U.S. 574, 609 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring).
146 John D. Colombo, The Role of Access in Charitable Tax Exemption, 82 WASH. U. L.
Q. 343, 364 n.85 (2004) (quoting Chauncey Belknap, The Federal Income Tax Exemption
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sachoff noted, “the avowed mission of many social service agencies
. . . is to empower individuals, families, and communities in poverty
and to assist them along the path to economic self-sufficiency.”147
For example, the nonprofit California health conglomerate Catho-
lic Healthcare West believes in promoting “justice, dignity [and]
collaboration.”148  Action for Boston Community Development has
as its “lifelong mission to promote self-help for low-income people
. . . .”149  Lifespire, in New York City, seeks to help clients “reach
life’s aspirations.”150
These values and specific aims are the cornerstone of pro-
union demands.  For example, in seeking better wages and bene-
fits—particularly pay equity for comparable work151—nonprofit
workers expect their agencies to engage in practices that are con-
sistent with these principles.152  In one union drive examined by
Peters and Masaoka, the politics of privatization figured explicitly
as a primary motivating factor:  “We didn’t want to be part of driv-
ing people’s wages down.  The money nonprofits are getting is
money government is not getting, let’s face it.  If we take on more
work, we absorb the social service and welfare cuts.”153
Peters and Masaoka found that, for pro-union staff, unmet ex-
pectations in this regard “created a sense that they had been misled
or betrayed.”154  More than workers in the corporate sector, non-
profit workers expect a collegial, supportive, and inclusive work-
place that is safe and free of racism, sexism, and homophobia.155
of Charitable Organizations: Its History and Underlying Policy, in RESEARCH PAPERS SPON-
SORED BY THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS 2025,
2033–35 (U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury ed., 1977) (emphasis added)); see BERRY & AR-
ONS, supra note 142, at 3; see also Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31
B.C. L. REV. 501, 567 (1990) (nonprofits provide “metabenefit” of altruistic activity in
society, in addition to specific goods and services).
147 Passachoff, supra note 10, at 248–49.
148 Jason Tackenouchi, Getting Organized, DAILY NEWS L.A., Feb. 13, 2000, at B1.  In
fact, the Catholic Church has a policy of supporting unionization.  Pynes & Newman,
supra note 97.  The church “fully supports the rights of workers to form unions or
other associations to secure their rights to fair wages and working conditions [and]
firmly opposes organized efforts . . . to break existing unions or prevent workers from
organizing.”  DeBare, supra note 2.
149 About ABCD — Action for Boston Community Development, http://
www.bostonabcd.org/about.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
150 Baumer, supra note 7.
151 Respondents in Peters and Masaoka’s survey rated “[i]nequity between their
own compensation and that of workers in similar government jobs . . . more impor-
tant than the absolute level of compensation.”  Peters & Masaoka, supra note 8, at 312.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 313.
154 Id. at 310.
155 Id.
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Indeed, as Peters and Masaoka found, “there appears to be a
heightened expectation that nonprofits will be more supportive,
fair, and diverse than for-profit employers.”156  Moreover, “the
most frequently articulated reason for [workers’] pro-union stand”
is the need for a greater “voice” in agency decision-making.157  As
one of their interviewees said, “A lot of our work is about empower-
ing people.  But we didn’t feel empowered.  We wanted more of a
voice, more decision-making power.”158
Client interests also figure prominently into pro-union de-
mands.  Said one nonprofit worker:  “A lot of times workers on the
frontlines see exactly what a client needs and yet when we
presented this to management . . . we were blatantly disre-
garded.”159  Others argue that better treatment means more stabil-
ity and higher morale, the benefits of which inure to the clients.160
Peggie Smith has made this argument about child care workers,161
as has Kristin Gerrick vis-à-vis home health care workers.162  Union-
ization, says Smith, “stands to benefit not only the child care
workforce, but also the children who receive care.  Studies have
consistently shown that when child care workers are treated with
respect and dignity, they are more likely to provide quality care
and to remain in their jobs.”163  From these anecdotal examples, it
is clear that nonprofit social service workers who unionize rely on a
progressive and specific institutional identity to advance their
cause.
2. The Anti-Union Position: Social Service Nonprofits As
Regressive “Mediating Structures”
In contrast, unionization opponents point to the other,
equally characteristic side of the nonprofit contradiction, which
was theorized nearly thirty years ago.  In an article that “provided
the Reagan administration with the philosophical justification for
divesting public social programs to the nonprofit sector,”164 Peter
Berger and Richard John Neuhaus argued for “alternative mecha-
156 Peters & Masaoka, supra note 8, at 311.
157 Id. at 309; see also supra notes 2–7.
158 Peters & Masaoka, supra note 8, at 309.
159 See Espinosa Solis, supra note 2.
160 Peters & Masaoka, supra note 8, at 312.
161 Smith, supra note 9.
162 Gerrick, supra note 9.
163 Smith, supra note 9, at 402.
164 DAVIS L. GIES ET AL., THE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION: ESSENTIAL READINGS 4
(1990).
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nisms . . . to provide welfare-state services”165 and for “rethinking
the institutional means by which government exercises its responsi-
bilities.”166  The alternative institutions, they argued, must be infor-
mal “laboratories of innovation in social services.”167  Indeed,
Berger and Neuhaus specifically disparaged professionalization
and unionization—and especially the “unionization of profession-
als”—as a threat to the utility of these so-called “mediating struc-
tures.”168  In the context of the reactionary “selling job” that big
business and government had to do at the time,169 such “alterna-
tive mechanisms” simultaneously appease and “empower.”170
Salamon made a similar observation about advocacy organizations:
By making it possible to surface significant social and political
concerns, to give voice to under-represented people and points
of view, and to integrate these perspectives into social and politi-
cal life, these organizations function as a kind of social safety valve
that has helped to preserve American democracy and maintain a
degree of social peace in the midst of massive, and often dra-
matic, social dislocation.171
Hillel Schmid has alluded to the benefits of such governance
structures:  Transferring governmental functions to social service
nonprofits
undoubtedly serves some inherent interests of the government,
such as: (1) creating a political climate that enables and justifies
cuts in government programs; (2) laying the groundwork to
charge clients directly for some expenses for services (health,
welfare, education, housing, etc.); (3) protecting the govern-
ment against public responses to budget cuts . . . .  These inher-
ent functions shift the accountability and responsibility for
reporting about availability[,] accessibility, and quality of ser-
vices from government to nongovernment organizations,
thereby relieving the government of direct responsibility for the
well-being of its citizens.172
It is this institutional conception of social service nonprofits
that animates the anti-union position.  In response to workers’ eco-
165 Peter Berger & Richard John Neuhaus, To Empower People:  The Role of Mediating
Structures in Public Policy, in GIES ET AL., id. at 13.
166 Id. at 16.
167 Id. at 18.
168 Id. at 13.
169 See supra text accompanying note 86.
170 Berger & Neuhaus, supra note 165.
171 Lester M. Salamon, Nonprofit Organizations: America’s Invisible Sector, ISSUES OF DE-
MOCRACY, Jan. 1998, http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itdhr/0198/ijde/salamon.htm
(emphasis added).
172 Schmid, supra note 60, at 3.
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nomic demands, nonprofit managers typically—and understanda-
bly—claim that their “hands are financially tied.”173  Even though
some of them are quite handsomely paid,174 they argue that non-
profits simply cannot provide better wages, benefits, and working
conditions because funding is chronically unpredictable and inade-
quate.  Said Green of the California Association of Nonprofits:
We rely on contracts and donations, and tomorrow’s income is
not guaranteed.  The fear is the degree over which services
might be interrupted to meet the demands of a union contract
. . . .  We have always been able to hire and fire based on re-
sources.  One of the reasons government contracts with us is be-
cause we can do things cheaper, because we have been non-
union, and the government is unionized.175
“We work on one-year contracts,” said another nonprofit executive.
“Nobody is permanent.”176  The “reality,” echoed Cynthia Mat-
thews of Santa Cruz Planned Parenthood, is that “nonprofits can
never hope to equal the compensation levels of public institutions
or private industry.”177  These nonprofit managers point out that
competition for these scarce funds has only gotten stiffer as the
number of nonprofits multiply and for-profits penetrate traditional
nonprofit markets.178
In this conception, the nonprofit’s role is to address govern-
ment irresponsibility and ameliorate need by providing “value-
priced services.”179  Light captured this Sisyphean task:
173 Passachoff, supra note 10, at 254; see also Gerrick supra note 9, at 123.
174 Lipman, supra note 110 (discussing pay of various nonprofit CEOs).
We would never have expected that the activists who oppose excessive
salaries would target not the compensation in excess of $1 million in the
corporate sector, but Reverend Cecil Williams of Glide Memorial
Church and Lonnie Hicks of Family Service Agency, both of whom have
salaries just above or just under [$]100,000.
Jan Masaoka, Executive Dir. CompassPoint Nonprofit Servs., Talk at the San Francisco
Community Foundations Forum: 9.5 on the Richter Scale (Sept. 28, 1998), available at
http://www.compasspoint.org/assets/122_9point5onrichterscale.pdf [hereinafter
Masaoka, 9.5 on the Richter Scale].
175 Yewell, supra note 96.  Employers claim their “hands are tied by state and federal
regulations and reimbursement rates.” Gerrick, supra note 9, at 123.
176 See, e.g., Bennett Baumer, Organizing the Organizers, CITY LIMITS WKLY., June 13,
2005, http://www.citylimits.org/content/articles/viewarticle.cfm?articlenumber=
1735.
177 Yewell, supra note 96 (emphasis added).
178 See Jennifer Moore, A Corporate Challenge for Charities, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY,
Aug. 13, 1998, at 1.
179 Edward Epstein, Charities Chafing over Bargaining Offer from Union, S.F. CHRON.,
Feb. 2, 1998, at A13.  Weisbrod’s work on public goods theory suggests that nonprofits
tend to serve a gap-filling role vis-à-vis governmental enterprise, “meeting some of the
supramedian or idiosyncratic demand for public goods that is left unmet by govern-
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Doing more with less appears to come with the IRS tax exemp-
tion letter.  But unlike the federal government, the nonprofit
sector cannot disguise its deficits by ignoring future liabilities or
changing the start of the fiscal year.  And unlike the private sec-
tor, it cannot shelter itself by eliminating unprofitable product
lines, declaring bankruptcy, or falsifying profits.  The nonprofit
sector will do what it has always done: it will ask its workforce to
work harder and longer, and its workforce will do just that.180
Unlike the pro-union position, this pessimistic conception ac-
cepts rather than challenges the conditions of nonprofit funding.
The premium is therefore on nonprofits to be “flexible”—or “resil-
ient.”181  Management must be able to govern unilaterally and
restructure “on a dime.”182  Often, this has been framed as the flex-
ibility to innovate—flexibility that would be compromised by
unionization.  “A very strong ingredient in innovation is being able
to quickly respond to community needs,” said one foundation ex-
ecutive.  “If nonprofits have to meet and confer at length about
these shifts, it may be quite distracting.  It may cut off a training
field for new young leaders.”183  Indeed, union standards could
mean program cuts or, worse, result in the agency’s closure.184
Furthermore, like their corporate and government counter-
parts, nonprofit managers typically portray unions as “outsiders” or
“third parties:” a bothersome and unnecessary layer of
bureaucracy.
Decision making is . . . strongly associated with management’s
perception of the uniqueness of the nonprofit culture.  Manag-
ers and funders expressed concern that the introduction of a
union, with its requisite formal structures and processes, would
mean a loss of flexibility in the ways decisions are made.  They
stressed that flexibility is especially important in the nonprofit
sector because of its implications for developing timely, high-
quality programming and for responding to changes in funding
streams.185
This vision is all the more compelling because many, if not
most, managers are well-intentioned, hard-working individuals—
ment provision.”  Henry Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organizations, in FU-
TURE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 77, at 27, 35.
180 Light, supra note 99, at 6.
181 Salamon, Resilient Sector, supra note 45.
182 Peters & Masaoka, supra note 8, at 310.
183 Id.
184 Id.; see also BERKOWITZ, supra note 79.
185 Peters & Masaoka, supra note 8, at 310.
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and, indeed, many are union supporters.186  Again and again, how-
ever, many are compelled to oppose unionization because of social
service nonprofits’ role as quasi-governmental appendages.187
Nonprofit managers sometimes even invoke the agency mission to
justify their anti-union stance.  The Santa Cruz Planned
Parenthood, for example, marshaled its pro-choice mission to urge
workers to “choose” a non-union shop:  “We believe in choice,”
said spokeswoman Cynthia Mathews.188  More frequently, however,
nonprofit managers simply draw a bright line between nonprofit
workers, who should expect substandard working conditions in re-
turn for the work’s intrinsic rewards, and agency clients to whom
the organization is committed.  “I am not warm to the idea of work-
ers protecting themselves,” said one executive director.  “If you
want to work in nonprofits, it’s going to be lumpy.”189  As with their
pro-union antagonists, nonprofit managers (and workers) who op-
pose unionization rely on one side of the social service versus non-
profit duality.
III. THE CASE FOR INDUSTRY-WIDE UNIONIZATION
As the previous section illustrates, underlying the range of is-
sues that arise when social service nonprofits unionize is a funda-
mental debate about their institutional role.  During these
organizing drives, pro- and anti-union advocates articulate two
competing and seemingly irreconcilable visions:  Proponents look
to social service nonprofits as representing society’s noblest aspira-
tions, while opponents consign them to society’s “social safety
valve.”  By demanding that nonprofits provide better wages, bene-
fits, and working conditions and make good on their organiza-
tional missions, unionization proponents undeniably advance
186 Id. at 309 (“Many managers view themselves as pro-labor yet struggle to articu-
late reasons that nonprofits should be exempt from unionization but other organiza-
tions should not.  Their fears for the financial viability of their organizations are
relatively straightforward, but their reasons to protect the nonprofit sector and cul-
ture from unionization are just beginning to become clear.”)
187 See Gronbjerg, Nonprofits in the Political Economy, supra note 140, at 224–25.  So-
cial service nonprofits and public sector agencies have a symbiotic relationship:
“Once the public-nonprofit grants or contract funding system is established, public
agencies purchase more than service capacities and access to infrastructures, and non-
profits obtain more than revenues.  The relationship comes to involve also the ex-
change of legitimacy, knowledge, and influence.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
“[N]onprofit organizations function more often as a substitute for government rather
than in their traditional roles as an alternative, a supplement, or a complement.”
Kramer, supra note 58, at 369.
188 Yewell, supra note 96.
189 Peters & Masaoka, supra note 8, at 311.
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idealistic principles that are the raison d’etre of social service non-
profits.  Yet by demanding that nonprofit staff be flexible and will-
ing to sacrifice, unionization opponents also articulate a historical
function that is no less a part of the nonprofit identity.  Social ser-
vice nonprofits indeed embody a contradictory role, and union
campaigns force nonprofit staff to clarify which tendency—the pro-
gressive or the regressive—will define their agencies.  Unionization
forces nonprofit staff to choose sides and define, ultimately, the
nature of the nonprofit sector.  Should nonprofits concretely ex-
tend their representative ideals—indeed their specific organiza-
tional missions—to their workers?  Or should nonprofits require
their workers to exempt themselves from those aspirations and
force them to absorb the contrary interests of the state?
A. Harmonizing Nonprofit Values and Union Standards
Of course, the answers to these questions depend, in part, on
how one views unions generally, but these opposing tendencies are
reconcilable.  Not only does unionization improve client services
and substandard wages, benefits, and working conditions, it also
vindicates nonprofit values and counteracts nonprofits’ tendency
to facilitate cuts in social spending.  The first step in harmonizing
social service nonprofits’ institutional role, therefore, is to reject
the strictures of social service nonprofit funding—already-meager
government, foundation, and other private monies dedicated prin-
cipally to programmatic, not labor, costs. There have been promis-
ing initiatives in this regard.  For example, realizing the mutual
interests that Smith and Passachoff have observed,190 nonprofits,
organized labor, and other advocates have coalesced to:
• Lobby federal, state and local agencies to increase overall
funding for social service contracts.  In San Francisco, a coa-
lition of nonprofits and labor unions joined forces to seek an
increase in the funding of POS contracts.191
• Lobby foundations to build in higher labor costs into their
program grants.192
190 See Masaoka, 9.5 on the Richter Scale, supra note 174; see also SALAMON, STATE OF
NONPROFIT AMERICA, supra note 15, at 309.
191 Edward Epstein, S.F. Nonprofits, Union Reach Tentative Pact, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 20,
1998, at A20; see also Passachoff, supra note 10, at 254–55 (suggesting a retirement
plan and public school compensation scale to improve Head Start benefits and pay).
192 Smith, supra note 9; Passachoff, supra note 10. See, e.g., SALAMON, STATE OF NON-
PROFIT AMERICA, supra note 15, at 309; Masaoka, 9.5 on the Richter Scale, supra note
174, at 3; see also Passachoff, supra note 10, at 254–55 (discussing creation of retire-
ment plan and adoption of public school compensation scale as ways in which to
improve Head Start benefits and pay).
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• Advocate for POS contracts to abide by civil service pay
scales.  In San Francisco, although it was not fully successful,
SEIU Local 790 sought parity between the pay scales of city
and nonprofit employees doing comparable work.193  The
union also pursued legislation declaring that it was “not the
intent of the city” to use POS contracts to lower wages or
benefits.194
• Negotiate “successorship clauses” whereby existing bargain-
ing units in privatized government work transfer over to con-
tracted nonprofits.195
• Enlist collective support to increase the chances of nonprof-
its winning POS contracts from for-profit agencies.196
These initiatives are worth continuing and building upon, but
it is important to emphasize the need for industry-wide unioniza-
tion.  Perhaps more so than in any other industry—because of its
reliance on government contracts—industry-wide unionization
would ensure that social service nonprofits are not forced to com-
pete against each other in a contracting race to the bottom.  Indus-
try-wide unionization would remove the incentive to pit agencies
against one another.  Without industry-wide union standards, the
state—in partnership with anti-union nonprofit management (and
staff)—will always have the incentive to exploit the altruistic com-
mitment of nonprofit workers.
B. Union Organizing and Fundamental Social Change
While unionizing social service nonprofits industry-wide would
improve wages and working conditions, neutralize social service
nonprofits’ regressive governance function, and concretize non-
profit values, there is also something specific about the process of
union organizing, as opposed to, say, legislative or administrative
remedies, that paves the way for fundamental social change.  On a
more basic level, the battle over unionization is a debate about how
to solve the seemingly intractable problems facing social service
nonprofits: namely the desperate living conditions of the poor, the
sick, and the elderly—and the rest of the oppressed and exploited
who constitute the clientele of human service agencies.
Consciously or not, the anti-union position bespeaks the ideol-
193 SEIU Local 790 was able to get 82.5 cents out of every city worker’s dollar; of
course, that still gives the City of San Francisco a 17.5% windfall.  Interview with Dale
Butler, supra note 94.
194 Editorial, supra note 93.
195 See text accompanying note 134.
196 Id.
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ogy of an individualist, charitable solution; one in which nonprofit
staff—workers and management alike—are cast as morally driven
martyrs whose personal sacrifice is the sine qua non of their clients’
welfare.  Accepting that nonprofit funding is finite, appeals for
more resources will always land on deaf ears, and a broad-based
campaign challenging the state’s economic priorities is impossible,
anti-union advocates opt for a self-sacrificing solution.  Their strat-
egy is to appeal to the charitable impulse and devolve responsibility
for addressing societal problems on a discrete and ideologically
predisposed few who “get it.”  This not only wittingly or unwittingly
articulates the notion that well-intentioned “help” is the solution, it
also pessimistically dismisses the possibility of convincing others to
create change.  While unsurprising given the current lack of a sus-
tained progressive movement, union campaigns can cut through
such pessimism to find the areas of commonality between non-
profit activists and the working class.  Benevolent efforts by well-
meaning individuals are undoubtedly invaluable, but, given the
enormity and systemic nature of most social, economic, and politi-
cal problems in the United States, no amount of well-intentioned
acts of direct service and martyrdom will ever be enough.
Pro-union workers, on the other hand, espouse the ideology of
a collective, political solution.  Conjoining their clients’ class inter-
ests with their own, they challenge nonprofits’ oft-hidden and insti-
tutionally regressive role and make common cause against the
broader systemic forces causing these conditions.  By creating an
important bulwark against the insidious use of nonprofits as “medi-
ating structures,” unionization provides a crucial step towards
more structural solutions to these social ills.
In seeking unionization, nonprofit workers challenge the ex-
ternal and internal conditions under which their agencies operate.
They reject the mantra of fiscal austerity and argue for “expanding
the pie”—that is, additional funding not only for agency programs,
but also to improve wages, benefits, and working conditions.  That
coalition, in turn, refocuses the causes of and solutions to social
problems from the personal to the systemic—from clients and
workers to broader forces and interests.
CONCLUSION
The trends in government social spending, the nonprofit sec-
tor, and the labor movement make it likely that efforts to unionize
social service nonprofits will continue—even heighten.  Further
cuts in and privatization of state social services can only exacerbate
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the funding crisis and marketization that these organizations have
endured over the past thirty years.  The crisis in the labor move-
ment, too, will ensure that unions remain focused on the nonprofit
sector.  Indeed, the recent split in the AFL-CIO might actually in-
crease the number of nonprofit union drives.197  Nonprofit work-
ers will continue to shoulder these stresses.  How they—and
management—respond to unionization will depend on their view
of what nonprofits’ role is and ought to be and ultimately on their
interest in fundamental social change.
197 Karla Grossenbacher, The AFL-CIO Split: What It Means to Non-Union Nonprofits,
RISK MGMT. ESSENTIALS (Nonprofit Risk Mgmt. Ctr., Wash., D.C.), http://nonprofit
risk.org/nwsltr/archive/employment010206.htm.
